Proprietary Parts as a Secondary Market Strategy by Kleber, Rainer et al.
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Kleber, Rainer, Neto, Joao Quariguasi Frota and Reimann, Marc (2020) Proprietary Parts as 
a Secondary Market Strategy. European Journal of Operational Research, 283 (3). pp. 929-941. ISSN 
0377-2217 
Published by: Elsevier
URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.062 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.062>
This version was downloaded from Northumbria Research Link: http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/41703/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        
European Journal of Operational Research 283 (2020) 929–941 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
European Journal of Operational Research 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ejor 
Production, Manufacturing, Transportation and Logistics 
Proprietary parts as a secondary market strategy 
Rainer Kleber a , ∗, João Quariguasi Frota Neto b , Marc Reimann c , d 
a Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Universittsplatz 2, Magdeburg 39106, Germany 
b Alliance Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Booth St W, Manchester M15 6PB, UK 
c Department of Production and Operations Management, University of Graz, Universittsstrasse 15/E3, Graz 8010, Austria 
d Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, City Campus East, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST, UK 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
Article history: 
Received 1 May 2019 
Accepted 28 November 2019 
Available online 4 December 2019 
Keywords: 
Supply chain management 
Proprietary parts 
Product remanufacturing 
Closed-loop supply chains 
a b s t r a c t 
Introducing proprietary parts to gain a competitive edge is a well-known, yet poorly understood strategy 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) adopt. In this paper, we consider an OEM who sells new prod- 
ucts and competes with an independent remanufacturer (IR) selling remanufactured products. The OEM 
contemplates proprietary parts to manage the secondary market for remanufactured products. Thereby, 
the OEM designs its product to balance the trade-off between the cost of proprietariness and the extra 
income from selling the proprietary spare parts to the IR. Deterring market entry by the IR through 
prohibitively pricing the proprietary spare parts, an OEM strategy observed in several industries, is only 
optimal when the willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products is low. Otherwise, the OEM benefits 
more from sharing the secondary market profits with the IR through the use of proprietary parts. Finally, 
we find that the OEM can also use proprietary parts to strategically deter entry by the IR, discouraging 
her from collecting cores. This can support the OEM’s decisions to engage in remanufacturing even in 
the case of a collection cost disadvantage. While the introduction of proprietary parts is detrimental to 
both IRs and consumers, we show that for consumers such loss is reduced when the OEM engages in 
product remanufacturing. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
Remanufacturing is the process whereby used products are
ollected and brought back to their original cosmetic and func-
ional conditions ( Thierry, Salomon, Van Nunen, & Van Wassen-
ove, 1995 ). The remanufacturing business is worth billions of
ollars worldwide and is relevant to a considerable number of in-
ustrial sectors ( Hagerty & Glader, 2011; Stindt et al., 2017; Sundin
 Dunbäck, 2013 ). Remanufacturing is carried out by either the
riginal equipment manufacturer that also builds the new prod-
ct (henceforth referred to as the OEM or ‘he’) or by independent
emanufacturers (IR or ‘she’). OEMs frequently see the existence of
Rs as a menace, due to the widely accepted belief that remanu-
actured products are in direct competition with their new coun-
erparts ( Ferguson & Toktay, 2006; Guide & Li, 2010 ). ∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: rainer.kleber@ovgu.de (R. Kleber), 
oao.quariguasifrotanet@manchester.ac.uk (J. Quariguasi Frota Neto). 
t  
t  
s
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.062 
377-2217/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u“I think that they see us as another competitor, that customers
who buy refurbished items, they will not buy new ones.” (Inde-
pendent remanufacturer A, on the relationships between OEMs
and IRs) 1 
OEMs also believe that poorly remanufactured products can
ead to brand damage ( Guide, Harrison, & Van Wassenhove, 2003 ),
nd see little benefit in collaborating with IRs. 
“[...] if a customer chooses non-AirFlight 2 parts, we will proba-
bly write to the customer and say that we cannot take responsi-
bility for the quality [of the product].” (Aerospace OEM engaged
in B2B) 
This quote draws attention to a strategy many OEMs use to
ontrol the aftermarket of their products, namely the introduc-
ion of proprietary spare parts. A part is said to be proprietary if
he manufacturer holds the design rights. Examples, among many1 Unless otherwise stated, all quotes in this paper are from interviews and per- 
onal communications with the company representatives. 
2 Fictitious name. 
nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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2others, include Satair for Airbus Spare parts 3 or LG for white
goods 4 . Introducing proprietary parts increases the control the
OEM exerts over the marketing and sales of spare parts, and conse-
quently, the power over the supply chain of remanufactured prod-
ucts. In some cases, OEMs refuse to supply parts to non-authorized
repair shops, seek legal action against anyone modifying and re-
pairing their products or increase the prices of proprietary spare
parts to a point where remanufacturing becomes economically
infeasible ( Brandom, 2015; Dayen, 2015; Koebler, 2018; Matchar,
2016 ). This may force remanufacturers to consider other strategies
for sourcing spare parts. 5 To prevent the IR from doing so, the OEM
chooses parts to be proprietary that have a high failure rate. Such
practices are applied in the electronics industry ( McAllistair, 2013 ),
in automotive manufacturing ( Solon, 2017 ), and the white goods
industry as the following quote suggests: 
“I would guess over 90% of frost-free [fridges] fail because of
electronics. [...] New boards are simply too expensive as they
have to be bought from the manufacturer. The fridges are still
collected and are in demand because they look modern. Who
on a low income wouldn’t want one? The vast majority go for
scrap recycling.” (Independent remanufacturer B) 
This quote also highlights two other aspects. First, it suggests
that the use of proprietary parts affects society in general. It lim-
its consumer choice and contributes to the escalating volume of
products that are discarded every year, and that could be other-
wise diverted from the landfill to the secondary market. Second, it
ignores potential revenues from the sales of spare parts to be used
in the remanufacturing process that might outweigh the demand
cannibalization effect. 
In summary, introducing proprietary parts is a strategy for the
OEM to control the secondary market of used products and rev-
enue from the sales of spare parts. However, it is less obvious how
to implement it. Thus, our first research question is: 
• What is the OEM’s optimal market strategy when introducing
proprietary parts? 
This question captures explicitly whether the OEM should use
proprietary parts to preempt the secondary market or to extract
extra profits from it. Since the control over the secondary market
through the use of proprietary parts comes at a price, our second
research question is: 
• Under what conditions does the introduction of proprietary
parts pay off for the OEM? 
Without proprietary parts, the OEM accepts the potential en-
try of an IR and consequently, the profit decreases due to com-
petition between the new and remanufactured products. The OEM
also foregoes the potential profits accrued from the sales of spare
parts. Both aspects must be traded-off against the design and (re-)
manufacturing cost of proprietary parts. 
Using proprietary parts also has a side-effect that may be used
by the OEM to his own benefit. Large, multinational, OEMs often
find it difficult to compete with local IRs in collecting cores. Even
without the fear of demand cannibalization, this serves as a bar-
rier to OEM remanufacturing. In such a context, the OEM can use
proprietary parts to obtain exclusive access to the cores, by making3 http://www.satair.com/products/airbus-proprietary-parts . 
4 https://www.lg.com/us/support/lg- direct- service/parts- and- accessories . 
5 A commonly applied approach is to scavenge parts from used units. Note, how- 
ever, that because extra cores need to be collected and in some occasions pur- 
chased, and labor is employed, scavenged parts are not for free. Besides, scavenging 
parts creates additional complexities and even delays to the remanufacturing pro- 
cess, as remanufacturers might need to wait for similar products to the one being 
remanufactured. 
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phe secondary market unprofitable for the IR. Having removed this
ollection barrier, the OEM may then find it profitable to engage in
emanufacturing. This leads to our third research question: 
• Under what conditions should the OEM prefer in-house re-
manufacturing over IR remanufacturing after introducing pro-
prietary parts? 
To answer our research questions, we use a stylized model
ombining new product and proprietary parts pricing decisions of
he OEM with remanufactured product pricing decisions of the IR.
e model the proprietariness decision of the OEM by considering
he product design as well as (re-)manufacturing cost implications
f introducing proprietary parts. 
A first key insight is that – given proprietary parts are used
pre-empting the secondary market should only be the pre-
erred option when consumers’ willingness-to-pay for remanufac-
ured products is low. Otherwise, sales revenues from proprietary
arts outweigh the profit reduction on the primary market due to
emand cannibalization. This insight complements the existing lit-
rature, which argues that demand cannibalization of new by re-
anufactured products may be less of an issue for OEMs than they
xpect, as the loss in revenue due to cannibalization is compen-
ated by the secondary market ( Atasu, Guide, & Van Wassenhove,
010; Guide & Li, 2010 ). 
Our second key insight is that even if it is possible and optimal
rom the OEM’s point of view to deter the entry of an IR through
ew product pricing when there are no proprietary parts, intro-
ucing proprietary parts may be a better strategy. In doing so, the
EM can stick to his monopolist’s new product price and control
he entry threat by the IR on the secondary market purely by ad-
usting proprietary spare parts’ price. 
Our third key insight is that, counter to the findings from the
xtant literature, the OEM may engage in remanufacturing in sit-
ations where the IR would not. Previous work found that the IR,
ho does not have a stake in the primary market, faces lower hur-
les to enter the secondary market than the OEM. This may be
agnified if the IR has a collection cost advantage due to more lo-
al involvement and therefore easier access to cores than a global
EM. The present paper extends this literature by adding the man-
facturing cost component into the argument. Given the mark-up
he OEM charges for his proprietary parts, the IRs remanufactur-
ng cost is higher than the OEMs remanufacturing cost. We find
hat this remanufacturing cost advantage may outweigh the pri-
ary market profit decrease due to demand cannibalization and
ake OEM remanufacturing worthwhile if the OEM can overcome
he collection access issue. Here the proprietary parts serve as the
ever, as prohibitively pricing them discourages the IR to enter the
arket and collect cores, leaving the OEM without competition. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
ection 2 we place our work within and highlight our contri-
utions to the existing literature. Section 3 captures our base
odel and analysis of the non-remanufacturing OEM, while
ection 4 presents the extension focusing on OEM remanufactur-
ng. Finally, Section 5 concludes our paper. 
. Literature review 
Remanufacturing and closed-loop supply chain management
ave been extensively studied in the past decades. Comprehen-
ive literature reviews can be found in Souza (2013) and Govindan,
oleimani, and Kannan (2015) . Atasu (2016) integrated the lat-
st and most influential research in an edited book. Our study
uilds on two specific streams within the CLSC literature: market
egmentation and competition between new and remanufactured
roducts, as well as product design. 
R. Kleber, J. Quariguasi Frota Neto and M. Reimann / European Journal of Operational Research 283 (2020) 929–941 931 
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p.1. Market segmentation and competition in CLSCs 
Market segmentation and competition have been recognized as
ssential strands of research on CLSCs. Majumder and Groenevelt
2001) and Ferrer and Swaminathan (2010) addressed the com-
etition between an OEM and an IR and considered the volume
f returns as, respectively, a fraction of the products sold (and
herefore an exogenous variable) and as having a linear relation-
hip with collection effort. At asu, Sarvary, and Van Wassenhove
2008) proposed an alternative approach to modeling competition
nd contributed to prior research by incorporating green segments,
EM competition, and examining product life-cycle effects, while
rsdemir, Kemahlıo ˘glu-Ziya, and Parlaktürk (2014) considered the
mpact that quality has on the competition between the OEM and
he IR. Adding a supply chain stage by integrating a supplier pro-
iding a critical component required for both manufacturing and
emanufacturing, Jin, Nie, Yang, and Zhou (2017) and later Wu
nd Zhou (2019) showed that IR remanufacturing could increase
he OEM’s profit. In this setting, the supplier might be inclined to
ower the wholesale price of the component to increase both sales
f new products and returns to be remanufactured. 
Others have examined competition in the primary market, and
ow it affects the collection strategy. Heese, Cattani, Ferrer, Gilland,
nd Roth (2005) , e.g., studied the case where an OEM both manu-
actures and remanufactures products (i.e., hospital beds) and com-
etes with another OEM. Kumar Jena and Sarmah (2014) con-
idered the case of two OEMs competing at both primary and
econdary markets. Wu and Zhou (2017) extended the work of
avaskan, Bhattacharya, and Van Wassenhove (2004) by examining
he effect of competition in the primary market (the market for
ew products) in product recovery decisions. In the presence of a
roup of newness-conscious consumers, Wu and Zhou (2016) did
how how two competing OEMs can benefit from third-party re-
anufacturing. 
Some papers explicitly addressed OEM strategies to con-
rol the secondary market. For example, Ferguson and Toktay
2006) studied an OEM that preemptively collects cores without
ctually remanufacturing them. Oraiopoulos, Ferguson, and Toktay
2012) studied relicensing of software in the IT sector as a means
o benefit from the secondary market, as consumers buying re-
urbished hardware from an IR also must purchase a license for
 bundled software from the OEM. Finally, Hong, Govindan, Xu,
nd Du (2017) considered competitive settings where the IR is
ranted permission to apply remanufacturing technology from the
EM. They analyzed different types of licensing agreements be-
ween OEM and IR. 
Essentially, this stream of literature examined how OEMs com-
ete with IR and other OEMs and focused mostly on pricing deci-
ions. Moreover, it was usually assumed that the technology and
roduct design were exogenously given and did not change dur-
ng the decision horizon. The last two papers, Oraiopoulos et al.
2012) and Hong et al. (2017) , came closest to our setting in study-
ng a mechanism for the OEM to benefit from the secondary mar-
et. However, in both papers, it is assumed that product design is
xed, and licensing does not incur any cost for the OEM. Moreover,
n Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) the licensing interaction takes place
etween the OEM and the consumer directly, while in our model,
ike in Hong et al. (2017) , the proprietary parts (license) have to be
ought by the IR. 
.2. Product design 
Product design has different dimensions, and several of them
ave been studied in the past in the context of CLSCs. A stream
f literature focuses on demand-inducing product design and its
nteraction with used product recovery. Atasu and Souza (2013)nvestigated how product reuse impacts product quality choice and
ound that recovery may lead to higher product quality. They also
howed how the form of product recovery, recovery cost structure,
nd product take-back legislation affects a firm’s quality choice.
rsdemir et al. (2014) extended this work to the oligopoly setting
nd studied the competitive quality choice in the presence of re-
anufacturing. They found that when an OEM competes with an
R, remanufacturing may reduce quality and increase environmen-
al impact. 
Another sub-field of research has examined design choices af-
ecting remanufacturability and the cost of remanufacturing. Debo,
oktay, and Van Wassenhove (2005) studied the joint pricing and
emanufacturability decision faced by a manufacturer introducing
 remanufacturable product. If a firm can decide on product qual-
ty and remanufacturability levels, it will couple increased reman-
facturing with higher product quality, as shown in Gu, Chhajed,
etruzzi, and Yalabik (2015) . Wu (2012) studied the design-for-
isassembly problem in a supply chain formed by an OEM produc-
ng only new products and an IR. Using a two-period model, the
uthor found that the optimal level of disassemblability crucially
epends on the recovery costs of the used products. When recov-
ry costs are low, the OEM chooses low levels of disassemblabil-
ty to discourage competition by the IR. These papers are related
o our setting in that the introduction of proprietary parts by the
EM also affects the remanufacturing cost for the IR. However, in
one of these papers does the design decision yield direct benefits
n the secondary market for the OEM. 
.3. Summary of the contributions of our work to this literature 
Our paper builds on and contributes to the above streams of re-
earch within the CLSC field in two ways. First, by considering the
se of proprietary parts which — different than software licenses —
ncur a cost for the OEM both in designing them as well as in em-
edding them in new (and remanufactured) products, we model
ifferent market environments (e.g., white goods, heavy machin-
ry). Second, we also contribute to the understanding of an OEM’s
ptimal decisions under such costly action to control the secondary
arket. This decision essentially complements our understanding
f the mechanisms that can be deployed to manipulate remanu-
acturing costs. Different from the papers focusing on remanufac-
urability or design-for-disassembly, we model a setting where the
esign choice, i.e., the introduction of proprietary parts, is used by
he OEM to benefit directly from IR remanufacturing. Both OEM
nd IR, in this case, adopt a coopetition strategy, where the IR acts
s both competitor and buyer. This complements our understand-
ng of situations (see, e.g., Jin et al., 2017; Wu & Zhou, 2016; 2019 )
nder which third party remanufacturing can be beneficial to the
EM. 
. The case of a non-remanufacturing OEM 
To study the questions posed in the introduction, we use a styl-
zed model of an OEM offering new products only and an inde-
endent manufacturer (IR), which may compete with the OEM by
emanufacturing used products. The environment in which both
ompetitors operate is described in Section 3.1 . Then, we – in turn
derive and discuss the structure of the optimal market deci-
ions of both the OEM and the IR under generic parts only (in
ection 3.2 ) as well as under proprietary parts (in Section 3.3 ). A
omparison of the two cases and a discussion of their structural
ifferences is put forth in Section 3.4 . Using a comprehensive nu-
erical study, we also quantify the economic impact of using pro-
rietary parts for a broad set of possible scenarios. 
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Fig. 1. Model structure with proprietary parts. 
Table 1 
Summary of model notation. 
Parameters: 
0 < β ≤ 1 Fraction of the product that is proprietary 
(proprietary content) 
0 < c < 1 Marginal cost of a new product without 
proprietary content ( β = 0 ) 
0 ≤ψ Marginal cost increase induced by a fully 
proprietary product ( β = 1 ) 
0 < φ < 1 Cost advantage due to remanufacturing 
0 < c c Collection cost coefficient 
0 < δ < 1 WTP discount factor for remanufactured 
products 
0 < γ ≤1 Core collection yield factor, defined as the 
fraction of used products that is collectable 
0 < F cost for designing proprietary content 
Decision variables: 
w s Wholesale price of (proprietary content) spare 
parts (OEM) 
p n Sales price of new products (OEM) 
p r Sales price of remanufactured products (IR) 
Auxiliary variables: 
q n Sales quantity of new products 
q r Sales quantity of remanufactured products 
˜ c Effective remanufacturing cost 
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6 To test the robustness of our results with respect to the competitive setting, we 
also considered two alternative model variants. The first one keeps the Stackelberg 
structure and replaces the market price competition with quantity competition, i.e., 3.1. Model description 
Setting . Since our focus is on the competition between the OEM
and the IR, we assume – in line with prior research – a monop-
olist OEM on the market for new products ( Atasu, Toktay, & Van
Wassenhove, 2013; De Giovanni & Zaccour, 2014; Savaskan et al.,
2004 ). We assume a mature market and thus consider a single
period in a steady-state setting, where a period corresponds to
the usage period of the product ( Abbey, Kleber, Souza, and Voigt,
2017; Atasu and Souza, 2013 , see, e.g.,). At the end of the period, a
fraction γ of the new units sold at a price p n becomes available
for collection and subsequent remanufacturing, as in Esenduran,
Kemahlıo ˘glu-Ziya, and Swaminathan (2017) and Ferrer and Swami-
nathan (2006) . 
We also assume, as a starting point, that the OEM is currently
not engaged in remanufacturing his end-of-use products. Reasons
for that could be resource-based, like the absence of a logistical
collection network ( Stindt et al., 2017 ), or demand-based, such as
fear of cannibalization of new product sales ( Guide & Li, 2010 ).
While the OEM does not collect and remanufacture himself, he re-
alizes the threat of an IR entering the secondary market. In light
of that threat, the OEM considers redesigning his products using
proprietary parts. Being proprietary, these parts cannot be reman-
ufactured by the IR and must be purchased from the OEM, who
sells them at a markup. To become a competitive lever, the OEM
chooses such parts to be proprietary, which show a high failure
rate (compare the quote from Independent remanufacturer B in the
introduction). In order to focus on the OEM’s spare parts decision,
we assume the failure rate to be one. Thus, the IR can not scav-
enge collected cores for those parts. There is no such restriction
for non-proprietary parts that are procured from the market. 
OEM decision and cost . The OEM decides to introduce propri-
etary parts. Redesigning parts causes fixed design cost F per pe-
riod and, proportional to the proprietary content, it increases the
marginal cost of both, producing new products as well as propri-
etary spare parts. Thus, the OEM will typically try to make small,
inexpensive parts proprietary to keep his additional cost low, but
still exert control over the profitability of the secondary market.
An extreme example of this is the software re-licensing issue ana-
lyzed in Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) , as arguably the variable cost of
software is zero. Also, the quote from independent remanufacturer
B, mentioned in the introduction, indicates that OEMs choose low-
cost electronics parts as candidates for being proprietary. Based on
these observations, we let the parameter β reflect the fraction of
the product that is proprietary, and assume that β is an industry-
specific parameter, representing the smallest possible part that can
be redesigned appropriately. 
Given β , unit production cost, c n , are 
c n = β(1 + ψ) c + (1 − β) c = (1 + βψ) c, (1)
where c is the unit cost of a completely non-proprietary product,
and ψ is the percentage cost increase of a fully proprietary prod-
uct. Analogously, unit production cost of proprietary spare parts,
c p , is 
c p = β(1 + ψ) c. (2)
IR decision and cost . The OEM sets a per-unit wholesale price
w s ≥ c p he charges the IR for the proprietary fraction β of the
product provided as a spare part. For the remaining portion of the
product 1 − β, we assume that there is a cost advantage of reman-
ufacturing over new production, 0 < φ < 1. Consequently, the unit
remanufacturing cost for the IR, c r , become 
c r = w s + (1 − β) φc, (3)eing larger than the effective remanufacturing cost (without a
arkup), ˜ c, which would be 
˜ = β(1 + ψ) c + (1 − β) φc. (4)
In line with Atasu et al. (2013) , the IR faces convex collection
ost c c q 
2 
r for the used products, where q r is the collection quantity
nd c c ≥0 is a scaling parameter. Note that the IR would never col-
ect more than she wishes to remanufacture. Thus, q r is also the
umber of remanufactured units offered to the secondary market
t a price of p r . 
Consumer behavior . To finalize the description of our model, we
eed to characterize how the prices for new and remanufactured
roducts, p n and p r , respectively, will shape the demands on the
rimary and secondary market. Here we follow the utility based
pproach ( Abbey et al., 2017; Debo et al., 2005; Oraiopoulos et al.,
012; Souza, 2013 , see, e.g.,), which assumes that the willingness-
o-pay for the new product is distributed uniformly in the interval
0,1], and that all consumers show a lower willingness-to-pay for
he remanufactured product, reflected by a commonly applied dis-
ount factor δ < 1. Normalizing the market size to one, this yields
inear demand functions as follows ( Abbey et al., 2017 ): 
 n (p n , p r ) = 1 − p n − p r 
1 − δ and q r (p n , p r ) = 
δp n − p r 
δ(1 − δ) (5)
Fig. 1 visualizes the basic structure of our model. For ease
f reference, Table 1 summarizes our notation. In the considered
tackelberg setting with the OEM as a leader, the timeline of the
ecisions is given by the following steps: 6 
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Table 2 
Equilibrium prices and quantities with generic parts. 
Strategy No Partial Full 
region remanufacturing remanufacturing remanufacturing 
p n 
1+ c 
2 
− δ2 (1 −c) 
8 c c +8 δ−6 δ2 
1+ c 
2 
− δ(δ−cφ) 
4 c c +4 δ−2 δ2 
1+ c 
2 
− δ(δ+ γ (δ(2 −δ)+2 c c ))(1 −c) 
8 c c +8 δ−6 δ2 + γ δ(4 c c +4 δ−2 δ2 ) 
p r n.a. δ
1+ c 
2 
− δ(δ−cφ) 
4 c c +4 δ−2 δ2 −
δ(1 −δ)(δ−φ) c 
4 c c +4 δ−4 δ2 δp n −
2 δ(1 −δ) γ (δ(2 −δ)+2 c c )(1 −c) 
8 c c +8 δ−6 δ2 + γ δ(4 c c +4 δ−2 δ2 ) 
q n 
1 −c 
2 
+ δ2 (1 −c) 
8 c c +8 δ−6 δ2 
1 −c 
2 
− δ(δ−φ) c 
4 c c +4 δ−4 δ2 
1 −c 
2 
+ δ(δ−γ (δ(2 −δ)+2 c c ))(1 −c) 
8 c c +8 δ−6 δ2 + γ δ(4 c c +4 δ−2 δ2 ) 
q r 0 
δ−cφ
4 c c +4 δ−2 δ2 + 
(δ−φ) c 
4 c c +4 δ−4 δ2 γ q n 
Fig. 2. Characterization of the strategy regions when the OEM does not use proprietary parts for γ < ˆ γ (left) and γ ≥ ˆ γ (right). Parameters values are φ = 0 . 5 , ψ = 1 , 
c c = 0 . 2 , β = 0 . 1 , and γ = 0 . 42 (left) or γ = 0 . 7 (right). 
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f  1. Initially, the OEM decides whether or not to introduce propri-
etary parts to his product. 
2. Then the OEM decides on the price for the new product p n and,
if applicable, on the wholesale price for proprietary spare parts
w s . 
3. Finally, the IR decides on the price of remanufactured products
p r . 
The equilibrium to all considered model variants is derived
hrough backward induction. Thus, below we first present the opti-
al decisions of the OEM and the IR under a fixed proprietariness
etting. 
.2. Benchmark: selling the product with generic parts 
When the OEM refrains from introducing proprietary parts, the
roduction cost is c n = c and remanufacturing cost becomes c r =
c due to the fully generic content of the product. The profit func-
ions of the OEM and the IR in the considered Stackelberg game
ith the OEM as the leader are as follows. 
ax 
p n 
OEM gen (p n | p r ) = (p n − c) q n s.t. 0 ≤ q n (6) 
ax 
p r 
IR gen (p r | p n ) = (p r − φc − c c q r ) q r s.t. 0 ≤ q r ≤ γ q n (7) 
esides non-negativity constraints on all quantities, the IR faces
he core availability constraint q r ≤γ q n . 
The following lemma characterizes the different equilibrium
trategy regions when selling the product with generic parts (For
ll proofs see Appendix A ). he OEM sets q n while the IR sets q r . The second one assumes that market prices 
re determined simultaneously by the OEM and the IR. We model this as a Nash- 
ame. It turns out that the main structural insights are unchanged. The results are 
rovided in Appendix C . 
t  
uemma 1. In the case of generic parts, characteristics of the equilib-
ium regions are provided in Table 2 . There exists a threshold value for
he core collection yield factor, ˆ γ , and two threshold values for the
arginal cost of a new product ˆ c1 and ˆ c2 (for functional forms see
he proof in Appendix A ). The equilibrium regions can be described as
ollows: 
No remanufacturing. If δ ≤φ and c ≥ ˆ c1 , the IR does not enter the
arket, i.e., q r = 0 . 
Partial remanufacturing. If ( δ ≤φ and ˆ c1 > c > ˆ c2 ) OR ( δ > φ and
≥ ˆ γ and c < ˆ c2 ), the IR enters the market but does not remanufac-
ure all available cores, i.e., 0 < q r < γ q n . 
Full remanufacturing. If ( δ ≤φ and ˆ c2 ≥ c) OR ( δ > φ and γ ≥ ˆ γ
nd c ≥ ˆ c2 ) OR ( δ > φ and γ < ˆ γ ), the IR enters the market and re-
anufactures all available cores, i.e., q r = γ q n . 
Fig. 2 visualizes the strategy space for the two cases regarding
hether the core collection yield factor, γ , is larger or smaller than
hreshold ˆ γ . In case of pure price competition, the OEM reacts to
he entry threat – even if the IR does not enter the market – by
educing the price of new products ( Atasu et al., 2008 , compared
ith a monopoly market price p n = 1+ c 2 , see,) and giving up some
rofit. If consumers put a low value on the remanufactured version
f a low margin product ( δ small and c high), the OEM thus deters
arket entry by the IR and avoids cannibalization of new product
emand. 
.3. Selling the product with proprietary parts 
In this section, we study how the use of proprietary parts af-
ects the competitive environment. The competitive pricing solu-
ion is obtained from the following price game between the man-
facturer and the IR: 
max 
p n ,w s 
OEM prop (p n , w s | p r ) 
= (p n − c n ) q n + (w s − c p ) q r − F s.t. 0 ≤ q n (8) 
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Table 3 
Equilibrium prices and quantities in all three strategy regions. 
Strategy No Partial Full 
region remanufacturing remanufacturing remanufacturing 
w s ≥ c p + δ(1 −c n ) 2 c p + δ−˜ c2 c p + (δ+2 c c γ+(2 −δ) δγ )(1 −c n ) 2(1+ δγ ) 
p n 
1+ c n 
2 
1+ c n 
2 
1+ c n 
2 
p r n.a. δp n − δ(1 −δ)(δc n −˜ c) 4(c c + δ(1 −δ)) δp n −
γ δ(1 −δ)(1 −c n ) 
2(1+ δγ ) 
q n 
1 −c n 
2 
1 −c n 
2 
− δ(δc n −˜ c) 
4(c c + δ(1 −δ)) 
1 −c n 
2 
− γ δ(1 −c n ) 
2(1+ δγ ) 
q r 0 
δc n −˜ c
4(c c + δ(1 −δ)) γ q n 
Fig. 3. Characterization of the strategy regions in the case of an OEM using propri- 
etary parts. ( φ = 0 . 5 , ψ = 1 , c c = 0 . 2 , β = 0 . 1 , and γ = 0 . 7 ). 
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p r 
IR prop (p r | p n , w s ) = (p r − c r − c c q r ) q r s.t. 0 ≤ q r ≤ γ q n 
(9)
Note that by model design the unit production cost of a new prod-
uct must not exceed an upper bound, c max , which corresponds to
the fraction of proprietary content β , i.e., c < c max = 1 1+ βψ . Other-
wise, new production would become non-profitable. 
The following lemma characterizes the different strategy re-
gions in the equilibrium. 
Lemma 2. In the case of proprietary parts, characteristics of the equi-
librium regions are given in Table 3 . If new production is profitable
(c < c max ), there exists a threshold value for the marginal produc-
tion cost of a new product, c¯ 1 (for functional form see the proof in
Appendix A ), and the equilibrium regions can be described as follows:
No remanufacturing. If δ < ˜ cc n , the IR does not enter the market and
the OEM acts like a monopolist, i.e., q r = 0 . 
Partial remanufacturing. If δ ≥ ˜ cc n and c < c¯ 1 , the IR enters the market
but does not remanufacture all available cores, i.e., 0 < q r < γ q n . 
Full remanufacturing. If δ ≥ ˜ cc n and c ≥ c¯ 1 , the IR enters the market
and remanfactures all available cores, i.e., q r = γ q n . 
Fig. 3 shows the strategy space. Note that region 0 depicts the
disregarded case where new production is not viable. 
Using the results from Lemma 2 , we can characterize the effect
of β on the IR entry deterrence by the OEM. 
Proposition 1. It is optimal for the OEM to deter market entry by
the IR – by setting the spare parts price w s accordingly – whenever
β > δ−φ
1 −φ+(1 −δ) ψ . 
Proposition 1 complements the results from Oraiopoulos et al.
(2012) for the case of relicensing fees – which arguably coincide
with zero proprietariness of the product itself – where it wasound that the OEM only deters entry by the IR if the secondary
arket is not very profitable, e.g., shown in a low customer valua-
ion δ. This of course also holds in our model, where Fig. 3 shows
hat for small values of δ entry deterrence is optimal. In our case,
owever, even a large δ – implying that the secondary market is
ery profitable – does not ensure market entry of the IR as long
s β is large enough. If the resulting additional cost of providing
pare parts, also impacted by ψ , is high, the OEM prefers to price
he parts such high to makes it no longer worthwhile for the IR to
nter the secondary market. 
On the other hand, we find that for sufficiently high δ and small
, it is indeed optimal for the OEM to let the IR enter. Under op-
imal choice of the wholesale price w s (as shown in Table 3 ), the
EM’s extra profits due to spare parts sales compensate for the re-
uced profits on the primary market caused by the cannibalization
f new product sales in such a scenario. 
.4. Comparison of strategies under the use of proprietary parts 
ersus generic parts only 
Having analyzed the strategies under generic parts only and
roprietary parts, respectively, we now turn to a comparison of
he two strategies. Comparing Table 3 with Table 2 reveals another
nteresting result. Without proprietary parts, the OEM lowers its
rice p n – taking the market conditions into account – to establish
 more hostile environment for the IR. Conversely, when introduc-
ng proprietary parts, the OEM controls competition solely through
he choice of the wholesale price w s for spare parts, without the
eed to adapt the market price for new products p n . Moreover, we
lso find that under proprietary parts, the OEM can deter entry by
he IR for a wider range of cost values c and WTP discount factor
alues δ. In other words, when using proprietary parts, the OEM
ay find it optimal to deter entry, when it would otherwise –
hen using generic parts only – be faced with partial or full re-
anufacturing by the IR. 
Further, an analysis of the boundaries separating the partial and
ull remanufacturing responses of the IR in settings with and with-
ut proprietary parts ( ¯c 1 and ˆ c2 , respectively) shows two interest-
ng facts. When γ is low, i.e., the core collection yield is low, or
is high, but c c = 0 , i.e., collection is free we find that ˆ c2 < c¯ 1 
lways holds, and, more generally, the use of proprietary parts al-
ays reduces the level of remanufacturing. In those scenarios, the
EM uses the proprietary parts to protect its primary market prof-
ts. However, when γ is high, and c c is sufficiently large as well,
he OEM may find it optimal – by setting the spare parts price w s 
ccordingly – to induce the IR to remanufacture fully under pro-
rietary parts, when the IR would only partially remanufacture if
ll parts were generic, i.e., we get ˆ c2 > c¯ 1 . This reflects once again
he overall profit view of the OEM, who may find it optimal to ac-
ept lower primary market profits in exchange for an increase in
econdary market profits due to spare parts sales. 
Now that we have discussed the different market implications
f using versus not-using proprietary parts, we can finally focus on
he OEM’s decision whether or not to introduce proprietary parts
t all. To do so, we need to compare the profits under the two
trategies. Since the OEM will prefer introducing proprietary parts
nless the cost of doing so is too high, an increase in β , ψ , or F
akes the introduction of proprietary parts less favorable. How-
ver, for the remaining parameters, no such clear-cut results hold
n general. Thus, below we will resort to numerical analysis to pro-
ide insights into the impact of each parameter on the decision
nd profitability of using proprietary parts. 
Before we do that, we turn to one interesting particular sce-
ario. From Lemma 1 and Fig. 2 we know that when the OEM
ses only generic parts, the IR does not enter the secondary mar-
et for small WTP discount factor, δ ≤φ, and high new product’s
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Table 4 
Experimental design. 
Parameter β c ψ φ c c δ γ ξ ν
Low 0.1 0.2 0 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0001 0 
High 0.3 0.6 0.25 0.7 0.3 0.85 0.7 0.001 2 
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jnit cost, c ≥ ˆ c1 . In that case, it would seem that introducing pro-
rietary parts cannot make sense. However, Proposition 2 provides
onditions under which the OEM is better off by introducing pro-
rietary parts. 
roposition 2. Assume that δ ≤φ, and c ≥ ˆ c1 , i.e., the IR would not
nter even if the OEM only uses generic parts. In that case, the OEM
till prefers to introduce proprietary parts when 
 < β < 
1 − c − 2 
√ 
2(1 −c) 2 (2 c c +(2 −δ) δ)(c c + δ−δ2 ) 
(4 c c +(4 −3 δ) δ) 2 + F 
cψ 
(10) 
For such a situation to exist, the right-hand side term in in-
quality (10) must be positive, requiring, e.g., the cost for designing
roprietary content, F , not to be too large. Thus, the OEM benefits
rom introducing proprietary parts and pricing them prohibitively
xpensive in order not to sell them to the IR. Thereby the OEM
voids the profit loss due to the strategic price reduction for the
ew product p n . The condition given in Proposition 2 provides an
pper bound on the fraction of proprietary content β that guaran-
ees that the associated extra primary market profit outweighs the
ost of introducing proprietariness. 
To explicitly quantify the economic differences between using
nd not using proprietary parts by the OEM, we now present the
esults of a comprehensive numerical analysis. After introducing
he experimental design, we focus on the OEM’s profitability and
ecision making but also briefly highlight the implications for the
R and the consumers. 
.4.1. Experimental design 
To capture a wide set of industry scenarios, we employ a full-
actorial experimental design. For each relevant parameter, we con-
ider two values, a high one and a low one. These values are
hown in Table 4 and were chosen in line with previous work on
emanufacturing ( Ferguson, Fleischmann, & Souza, 2011; Ferguson,
uide, & Souza, 2006; Guide, Souza, Van Wassenhove, & Blackburn,
006; Subramanian & Subramanyam, 2012 ). The values of β and
 were estimated based on interviews with company representa-
ives from both computer OEMs as well as white-goods OEMs. In
erms of fixed design cost F , we utilize the possibilities of the nu-
erical study to analyze different structures. Specifically, we de-
ne F = ξβν, where ξ reflects the design cost factor for makingFig. 4. Violin plot of relativeroprietary content and ν models the design efficiency. For ν , we
onsider two special but realistic cases. The first one ( ν = 0 ) re-
ects a fixed design cost, which is independent of the fraction of
roprietary content in the final product. The second one ( ν = 2 )
epresents quadratic cost, which models the increasing difficulty of
aking a larger proportion of the product proprietary. Finally, the
alues of ξ have been chosen such that all strategy regions are rel-
vant. Overall, we obtain 512 instances (9 parameters with 2 real-
zations each, i.e. 2 9 = 512 ). The full set of results can be obtained
rom the authors. Here, for the sake of brevity, we focus on the
ost relevant, aggregated results. 
.4.2. Profit and decision-making impact on the OEM 
We first consider the profit impact of using proprietary parts
n the OEM. On average over all the 512 instances, the OEM gains
5% (computed as 
OEM prop −OEM gen 
OEM gen 
) by using proprietary parts. The vi-
lin plot in Fig. 4 presents the distribution of percentage changes
n OEM profit when introducing proprietary parts, supporting the
idespread use of proprietary parts in practice. 
To get a deeper insight, we take a more granular look at our
esults. Specifically, for each model, we distinguish between the
ases with ( q r > 0) and without ( q r = 0 ) remanufacturing. Tables 5
nd 6 provide the results for each of the resulting four strategy
ombinations. The left panel of Table 5 , showing the prevalence
f each combination, confirms that we can never have a situation
here there is remanufacturing under the use of proprietary parts
ut no remanufacturing without proprietary parts. In 25% of the
ases, the OEM deters entry by the IR through using proprietary
arts when in the case of generic parts, he would let the IR en-
er. However, in the majority of cases, it is optimal not to deter
R market entry regardless of whether or not proprietary parts are
sed. 
The right panel of Table 5 provides the profit implications of
sing proprietary parts (compared to not using them) for these
ifferent strategy combinations. Clearly, profit differences are more
ronounced when it is optimal for the OEM, who introduces pro-
rietary parts, to let the IR enter the secondary market. Here, the
EM capitalizes on profitably selling proprietary parts and thereby
haring the revenues on the secondary market with the IR. This is
lso shown by the results in Table 6 , where we present the average
rice and quantity changes on both the primary and the secondary
arket (where applicable). Clearly, in the scenarios where the IR
nters regardless of the OEM’s strategy, the introduction of propri-
tary parts allows the OEM to charge a 30% higher price for new
roducts while only facing a 19% reduction in quantities. Thus, the
EM does not only benefit from the secondary market but also en-
oys increased primary market profits.  OEM profit changes. 
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Table 5 
Distribution of instances (left panel) and average relative OEM profit changes (right panel). 
# of instances Model gen 
OEM prop −OEM gen 
OEM gen 
Model gen 
No reman Reman No reman Reman 
Model prop No reman 64 128 Model No reman −6% 21% 
prop Reman 0 320 prop Reman – 81% 
Table 6 
Average relative price changes (left panel) and quantity changes (right panel). 
p n,prop −p n,gen 
p n,gen 
Model gen 
q n,prop −q n,gen 
q n,gen 
Model gen 
( 
p r,prop −p r,gen 
p r,gen 
) No reman Reman ( 
q r,prop −q r,gen 
q r,gen 
) No reman Reman 
Model no reman 4% (–) 14% (–) Model no reman −15% (–) −4% ( −100%) 
prop reman – (–) 30% (37%) prop reman – (–) −19% ( −64%) 
Table 7 
Impact of model parameters on average relative OEM profit changes. 
OEM prop −OEM gen 
OEM gen 
c 
low high 
φ φ
low high low high 
c c c c c c c c 
low high low high low high low high 
δ low γ low 19% 17% 19% 16% 14% 11% −6% −7% 
high 44% 27% 25% 16% 40% 35% −6% −7% 
high γ low 75% 49% 72% 47% 65% 44% 64% 41% 
high 156% 110% 151% 96% 155% 126% 145% 99% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Average relative IR profit changes and consumer surplus changes (in brackets). 
IR prop −IR gen 
IR gen 
(
ϒprop −ϒgen 
ϒgen 
)
Model gen 
No reman Reman 
Model prop No reman – ( −27%) −100% ( −36%) 
Reman – −93% ( −54%) 
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l  We also observe that, on average, the OEM is worse off by in-
troducing proprietary parts to deter the IR in an environment in
which this would occur under generic parts as well. In those cases,
the average profit change is −6%, as shown in the right panel of
Table 5 . This decrease results from situations in which we find a
high fixed cost, F , or a large proprietary content, β . Disaggregat-
ing the results, however, reveals that there are 24 instances in line
with Proposition 2 , in which the OEM prefers to introduce propri-
etary parts with an average profit increase of 1.6%. Summarizing,
our results suggest that using proprietary parts to preempt the sec-
ondary market is the preferred option for the OEM only in a minor-
ity of possible environments. In most of the considered scenarios,
the OEM benefits more from strategically using these proprietary
parts to skim some profits from the secondary market. 
To conclude this part of our analysis we show the impact of the
model parameters on the relative OEM profit changes. The effects
of β , ψ and F have been discussed before, so in the presentation in
Table 7 , we focus on the remaining five parameters. In terms of in-
dividual parameters, we find that increases in δ and γ enhance the
OEM’s relative profitability of introducing proprietary parts, while
increases in c , c c , and φ reduce the benefits of introducing pro-
prietary parts. Quantitatively, we observe that δ has the strongest
effect, while the impact of c and φ is mild to negligible. 
Overall, using proprietary parts is particularly beneficial for the
OEM when γ and δ are high, while c c is low. In such an environ-
ment (bold numbers in Table 7 ), the average profit increase from
proprietary parts is around 150%. In other words, when cores are
freely available as well as cheap to collect, and consumers have
a high acceptance of remanufactured products, the OEM would
forego substantial benefits by not using proprietary parts and shar-
ing the secondary market profits with the IR. On the other hand,
the combination of high values of c , φ, and c c with a small δ con-
stitutes the most hostile environment for proprietary parts. Here,
the primary market is small and little profitable. Moreover, reman-
ufactured products can only be sold at a significant discount andre both costly to collect and remanufacture. Jointly, these market
haracteristics (underlined numbers in Table 7 ) make the invest-
ent in proprietary parts costly (in terms of primary market prof-
ts) but little effective (in terms of gains from preempting the sec-
ndary market). Specifically, the OEMs profit would decrease by an
verage of 6–7% when using proprietary parts, implying that the
EM should stick with a purely generic product. 
.4.3. Impact on the IR and consumer surplus 
To conclude this section, we briefly highlight and discuss the
ffect of the strategy adopted by the OEM on the IR’s profit as well
s on consumer surplus. In line with the assumptions made for
eriving demand functions (5) , we define the consumer surplus ϒ
o be the cumulative difference between a consumer’s willingness
o pay for the chosen product (new or remanufactured) and the
orresponding price, which calculates as follows (for a derivation
ee Appendix B ) 
= q n 
(
1 − p n − q n 
2 
)
+ δq 
2 
r 
2 
(11)
Table 8 shows the average relative changes in IR profits and
onsumer surplus (in brackets). As expected, both IR and con-
umers are worse off when the OEM introduces proprietary parts.
nterestingly, the OEM can essentially extract all the extra profits
rom the secondary market when introducing proprietary parts and
etting the IR enter. Also, consumer surplus takes the most sub-
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Table 9 
Equilibrium prices and quantities under OEM remanufacturing in all three strategy regions. 
Strategy No Partial Full 
region remanufacturing remanufacturing remanufacturing 
p n 
1+ c n 
2 
1+ c n 
2 
1+ c n 
2 
− γ (δc n −˜ c(1+ γ δ)+ γ (αc c + δ) c n −γ (αc c + δ(1 −δ))) 
2(1+2 δγ+(αc c + δ) γ 2 ) 
p r n.a. δp n − δ(1 −δ)(δc n −˜ c) 2(αc c + δ(1 −δ)) δp n −
δ(1 −δ) γ (1 −c n + γ (δ−˜ c)) 
2(1+2 δγ+(αc c + δ) γ 2 ) 
q n 
1 −c n 
2 
1 −c n 
2 
− δ(δc n −˜ c) 
2(αc c + δ(1 −δ)) 
1 −c n + γ (δ−˜ c) 
2(1+2 δγ+(αc c + δ) γ 2 ) 
q r 0 
δc n −˜ c
2(αc c + δ(1 −δ)) γ q n 
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e  tantial dip in those cases. The reason for this is the large price
ncrease on both the primary and secondary markets and the as-
ociated massive drop in remanufactured product sales (compare
able 6 ). 
. Remanufacturing by the OEM 
So far, we considered the case of a non-remanufacturing OEM.
s mentioned in Section 3.1 , the reasons for not remanufacturing
ome from two categories, namely, demand-based and resource-
ased issues. On the demand side, the cannibalization of new
roduct sales critically impacts the OEM’s decision not to sell re-
anufactured products. However, this opens the door for IRs who
o not worry about primary market profits. In the above analysis,
e have seen how the non-remanufacturing OEM combines pro-
rietary parts and an appropriate pricing strategy to counter the
ntry threat by an IR. Yet, there may still be resource-based ob-
tacles, including the lack of remanufacturing capabilities as well
s the difficulty of accessing cores. While the former hurdle is in-
ernal to the OEM, the latter relates to competition with the more
ocally operating IR who may collect cores more efficiently. In this
ase, the OEM may be reluctant to develop its internal reman-
facturing skills. However, if the OEM could more easily access
he cores, he might consider remanufacturing more favorably. In
olving this issue, proprietary parts can play a role since pricing
hese parts to deter market entry also removes the IRs incentive
o collect cores. Thus, the OEM may gain exclusive access to used
roducts and might decide to perform remanufacturing himself. In
hat follows, we analyze this scenario by assuming that the OEM
ets the wholesale price of the proprietary content, w s , such high
hat the IR is deterred. 
For parsimony (w.l.o.g.), we consider the same demand func-
ions (5) as in the IR remanufacturing case by assuming that the
aluation of the products does not depend on whether the OEM or
he IR remanufactures. Keeping the basic cost structure from the
ase of a non-remanufacturing OEM (see Section 3.3 ), the OEM’s
ost for remanufacturing a product with β proprietary content is
iven by 
 
OEM 
r = c p + (1 − β) φc. (12) 
ince OEMs typically are large multinational companies, having
o collect from long distances, and IRs are (relatively) small local
rms, we assume that the OEM faces higher collection effort. This
s modeled using a factor α> 1 on the collection cost which repre-
ents the collection cost disadvantage. Under these conditions, the
EM’s objective function becomes 
OEM 
prop+ rem (p n , p r ) = (p n − c n ) q n + (p r − c OEM r − αc c q r ) q r − F . (13)
gain, the core availability constraint q r ≤γ q n has to hold.
emma 3 characterizes the strategy applied by the OEM. 
emma 3. In the case of proprietary parts, characteristics of the equi-
ibrium regions under OEM remanufacturing are given in Table 9 . If
ew production is profitable (c < c max ), there exists a threshold value
or the marginal production cost of a new product, c¯ 3 (for functional
orm see the proof in Appendix A ), and the equilibrium regions can be
escribed as follows: No remanufacturing. If δ < ˜ cc n , the OEM does not remanufacture,
.e., q r = 0 . 
Partial remanufacturing. If δ ≥ ˜ cc n and c < c¯ 3 , the OEM remanu-
actures some cores, i.e., 0 < q r < γ q n . 
Full remanufacturing. If δ ≥ ˜ cc n and c ≥ c¯ 3 , the OEM remanufac-
ures all available cores, i.e., q r = γ q n . 
Note that the only structural difference between the equi-
ibrium regions under OEM remanufacturing as shown in
emma 3 and the ones under IR remanufacturing shown in
emma 2 is the threshold value for the marginal production cost
f a new product, c¯ 3 . This difference is characterized in the follow-
ng lemma. 
emma 4. Whenever 1 ≤ α ≤ 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c we observe that c¯ 1 ≥ c¯ 3 .
onversely, whenever α > 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c we get c¯ 1 < c¯ 3 . 
This implies that for small α, i.e., when the OEMs collection dis-
dvantage is not too pronounced, the OEM will switch from partial
o full remanufacturing at smaller production cost c than the IR.
omparing the remanufacturing quantities in Tables 3 with their
espective counterparts in Table 9 , we obtain the following result: 
roposition 3. In cases where remanufacturing takes place, i.e. δ ≥
˜ c
c n 
, and where the collection cost disadvantage of the OEM is not
oo severe, i.e., α ≤ 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c , the OEM always remanufactures more
han the IR would. Even if α > 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c , the OEM remanufactures
ore than the IR would whenever c > c¯ 3 . 
Note that this result is counter to the extant finding in the
iterature (see, e.g. Ferguson & Toktay, 2006 ), according to which
he OEM has less inclination to remanufacture than an IR, since
e takes into account not only the potential extra profit on the
econdary market but also the profit decline in the primary mar-
et. Our result is driven by a missing double marginalization effect
rom selling spare parts, i.e., the OEM takes full advantage of any
pare part used and thus sells more remanufactured units. 
Using the same experimental setup as in the previous section,
e have quantified the increase in the remanufacturing quantity
 r as well as the change in OEM profit when switching from IR to
EM remanufacturing. Regarding the collection cost disadvantage
f the OEM, we assume two scenarios, namely α = 2 and α = 5
orresponding to low and high collection cost disadvantage of the
EM as characterized in Lemma 4 , respectively. 
For α = 2 , we observe that the OEM on average receives an ex-
ra profit of more than 6%. Additionally, on average, the OEM re-
anufactures around 24% more units than the IR would. For α = 5
nd in line with Proposition 3 , OEM remanufacturing exceeds IR
emanufacturing only if c > c¯ 3 . This scenario occurs in 20% of the
elevant cases, and the average increase in OEM profit and the re-
anufacturing quantity is 21% and 8%, respectively. 
As the OEM remanufacturing removes the double marginaliza-
ion effect arising when the IR would remanufacture using parts
ought from the OEM, this also increases consumer surplus by
oughly 8% on average. However, these benefits do not outweigh
he losses faced by the consumers after the introduction of propri-
tary parts (compare Table 8 ). Overall, in the described cases, the
938 R. Kleber, J. Quariguasi Frota Neto and M. Reimann / European Journal of Operational Research 283 (2020) 929–941 
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n  OEM benefits from using proprietary spare parts (and remanufac-
turing himself), while both the IR and the consumers lose. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the competition between an OEM
and an IR, where the OEM strategically adopts proprietary parts as
a means to obtain a competitive edge over IRs, and exert greater
control over the secondary market of remanufactured products.
This study was inspired by various first-hand accounts, as well as
cases reported in the media of such a strategy. 
We contribute to the existing literature by developing a frame-
work for strategic decision making concerning pricing (i.e., pric-
ing of new and remanufactured products) and the use of pro-
prietary parts. This enables the OEM to sufficiently control the
secondary market while keeping design and (re-)manufacturing
cost low. Moreover, by appropriately pricing the proprietary parts,
governance of the secondary market is possible for the OEM with-
out reducing the price of new products. Complementing the results
from Oraiopoulos et al. (2012) for the case of relicensing fees, the
use of proprietary parts to starve the secondary market is a suit-
able strategy for the OEM not only when the willingness-to-pay
for remanufactured products is low but also if the cost of provid-
ing such spare parts is high. This helps in explaining the apparent
prevalence of such a strategy in the white-goods industry, particu-
larly for washing machines, as indicated by our accounts with IRs
in that industry. 
Further, we find that the OEM might benefit from easier access
to cores. Global OEMs may find it difficult to compete with local
IRs in collecting cores. Here, the use of proprietary parts and a
prohibitive pricing strategy not only deters remanufacturing by the
IR but also discourages collection of cores, giving the OEM a first-
mover advantage (see, e.g., Ferguson & Toktay, 2006 ). This effect
can lead to situations where the OEM could remanufacture more
items than the IR would. While this result depends on the rela-
tive collection cost of the OEM compared to the IR, we find that
even under a twofold increase in the collection cost, the OEM can
extract a significant extra profit with this strategy. 
The insights of this paper are also relevant to IRs and policy-
makers. We demonstrated that even small changes in product de-
sign in the direction of making it more proprietary can lead to the
collapse of the secondary market, and have severe consequences
to IRs and consumers. We observed that IRs might even be pushed
out of the secondary market completely. Moreover, consumer sur-
plus also decreases when proprietary parts are adopted. Yet, OEM
remanufacturing softens this loss, at least for consumers. Thus,
any initiatives targeting standardization should be scrutinized by
policy-makers to ensure an overall benefit to the various stake-
holders. 
For future research, we encourage the examination of the sce-
nario where cores can be scavenged for parts by the IR. Since parts
scavenged from other cores by the IR reduce the volume of spare
parts the OEM can sell, it would be interesting to study the OEMs
durability/quality decision of his (proprietary) parts under such a
threat. 
Finally, we have assumed that the OEM is a monopolist on the
primary market. While this is a reasonable proxy to model partic-
ular market niches, there are many situations where competition
with other OEMs will decidedly shape an OEM’s decision. Regard-
ing the optimal proprietary content in the new product, such a
case could arise when the IR can remanufacture cores from dif-
ferent OEMs. In such a context, OEMs may even consider exclusiv-
ity clauses, where an IR is authorized to remanufacture the OEM’s
cores only if it does not remanufacture any other OEM’s cores. A
more detailed treatment of the effect of these complicating factors
on the OEM’s profitability presents another promising avenue for γ  urther research that can provide additional insights into the opti-
al proprietariness decisions by the OEM. 
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ppendix A. Proofs 
roof of Lemma 1 
We omit details of the proof here since it follows along the
ame lines as the proof for our main model in Lemma 2 given
elow. Yet, the detailed exposition of the proof can of course be
btained from the authors upon request. The functional forms of
ˆ , ˆ c1 and ˆ c2 are ˆ γ = δ2 c c +2 δ−δ2 ˆ  c1 = 
2 δ(c c + δ(1 −δ)) 
δ(4 φ−δ(2 −δ+3 φ)) −2 c c (δ−2 φ) and 
ˆ c2 = 2(c c + δ(1 −δ))(2 c c γ−δ(1 −(2 −δ) γ )) (2 c c +(2 −δ) δ)(δ+2 c c γ+(2 −δ) δγ ) −(2 c c (2+ δγ )+ δ(4 −3 δ+(2 −δ) δγ )) φ . 
roof of Lemma 2 
We first show that the IRs profit is concave in her decision vari-
ble p r . The profit function of the IR is given by 
IR 
prop (p r | p n , w s ) =
(p r − c r − c c q r ) q r . The second derivative of this function with re-
pect to p r is 
∂ 2 IR prop (p r | p n ,w s ) 
∂ 2 p r 
= − 2(c c + δ(1 −δ)) 
(1 −δ) 2 δ2 < 0 . Thus, the opti-
al response of the IR to the OEM’s decisions is given by the
nique maximizer of her lagrangian function, which is given by
 
IR (p r , λ, λ2 ) = IR prop (p r | p n , w s ) − λ(q r − γ q n ) + λ2 q r . Thus we get
p r = δ((1 −δ)(1+ δγ ) λ−(1 −δ) λ2 +2 c c p n +(1 −δ)(cφ−βcφ+ δp n )+ w s −δw s ) 2(c c + δ(1 −δ)) . 
Next, we insert this result into the OEM profit function
OEM 
prop (p n , w s | p r ) = (p n − c n ) q n + (w s − c p ) q r − ξβν . To check con-
avity of the OEM profit with respect to his decision vari-
bles p n and w s we compute the Hessian matrix as H =
−1 − c c + δ
c c + δ(1 −δ) 
δ
c c + δ(1 −δ) 
δ
c c + δ(1 −δ) −
1 
c c + δ(1 −δ) 
]
. The determinant of the matrix is
iven by det [ H] = 2 
c c + δ(1 −δ) > 0 , while the first leading minor is
egative. Thus, the OEM profit is jointly concave in his decision
ariables. Consequently, the OEM’s optimal decisions are given
y the unique maximizers of his profit function. We get p n =
1+ c n 
2 and w s = 
δ−λ−δγ λ+ λ2 −cφ+ βcφ+ c p 
2 = c p + δ−˜ c2 + 
λ2 −λ−δγ λ
2 . Now
e only have to consider the four possible cases resulting from
he two constraints. The case where both constraints are binding,
.e., q r = γ q n = 0 can be excluded since it is not interesting when
here is no production at all. Moreover, it can only happen when
 n ≥1, which we have ruled out by assumption. Then we are left
ith the three described cases. Observe first, that the price p n 
s independent of the constraints. Thus we already have the pro-
osed result. Now, let us start out with the partial remanufacturing
ase, i.e., the case where neither constraint is binding ( λ = λ2 = 0 ).
or this case w s simplifies to w s = c p + δ−˜ c2 , i.e., we have the pro-
osed result. From the condition that in this case 0 < q r < γ q n we
an readily obtain the two conditions δ ≥ ˜ cc n and c < c¯ 1 , where
¯ 1 = 2 γ (c c + δ−δ
2 ) 
γ [(2 c c + δ−δ2 )(1+ βψ)+ δ(1 −φ)(1 −β)]+(1+ βψ) δ−(1 −β) φ−β(1+ ψ) . The re-
aining prices and quantities can be readily obtained by plug-
ing in the values of p n and w s . Now let us move to the no
emanufacturing case, i.e., 0 = q r < γ q n . In that case λ = 0 and
2 > 0. Plugging these λ’s into w s and then p n and w s into
 r and finally, everything into q r and solving for q r = 0 we
btain λ2 = c(β(1 − φ + ψ − δψ) − δ + φ) = ˜ c − δc n . Since λ2 > 0
his yields δ < ˜ cc n . The remaining prices and quantities can again
e readily obtained by plugging in the values of λ2 and p n . Fi-
ally, the third case, full remanufacturing, implies that 0 < q r =
q n , and consequently λ> 0 and λ = 0 . Using the same logic2 
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Table C.10 
Equilibrium prices and quantities in all three strategy regions. 
Strategy R1 R2 R3 
region No remanufacturing Partial remanufacturing Full remanufacturing 
w s ≥ c p + δ(1 −c n ) 2 c p + δ−˜ c2 c p + (δ+2 c c γ+2 δγ )(1 −c n ) 2(1+ δγ ) 
p n 
1+ c n 
2 
1+ c n 
2 
1+ c n 
2 
p r n.a. δp n − δ(1 −δ)(δc n −˜ c) 2(2 c c +2 δ−δ2 ) δp n −
γ δ(1 −δ)(1 −c n ) 
2(1+ δγ ) 
q n 
1 −c n 
2 
1 −c n 
2 
− δ(δc n −˜ c) 
2(2 c c +2 δ−δ2 ) 
1 −c n 
2 
− γ δ(1 −c n ) 
2(1+ δγ ) 
q r 0 
δc n −˜ c
4(c c + δ(1 −δ)) γ q n 
c¯ Q 
1 
= (2 c c +(2 −δ) δ) γ
δ+2 c c γ+2 δγ−β(1+ δγ )(1 −φ) −(1+ δγ ) φ−β(1 −δ−2 c c γ−δγ ) ψ s in the no remanufacturing scenario, i.e., inserting these λ’s
nto w s and then w s and p n into p r and finally everything into
 r and q n and solving the equation q r = γ q n we obtain λ =
c(2 c c γ−φ+ δ(1+ γ (2 −δ−φ))) −βc((1+ δγ )(1 −φ)+(1 −2 c c γ−δ(1+ γ−δγ )) ψ) −2(c c + δ(1 −δ)) γ
(1+ δγ ) 2 . In- 
erting λ into q r and rearranging the condition q r > 0 straightfor-
ard algebra yields the two bounds δ ≥ ˜ cc n and c ≥ c¯ 1 . Similarly,
ll the remaining prices and quantities can be computed. This con-
ludes the proof of Lemma 2 . 
roof of Proposition 1 
From Lemma 2 we know that the OEM deters entry by the IR
henever δc n < ˜ c. Rewriting this in terms of β we directly get β >
δ−φ
1 −φ+(1 −δ) ψ . 
roof of Proposition 2 
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we know that the region where the
EM deters entry by the IR is always larger when there is pro-
rietary content in the product. Thus, we now only need to com-
are the profits for the no remanufacturing cases with and without
roprietary parts. In the model with proprietary parts, the OEM’s
ssociated profit is given by OEM prop = (1 −c n ) 
2 
4 − F . Conversely, in
he model without proprietary parts, the OEM’s profit is given by
OEM 
gen = (1 −c) 
2 
4 − δ
4 (1 −c) 2 
(8 c c +8 δ−6 δ2 ) 2 . The OEM prefers introducing propri-
tary parts whenever OEM prop > 
OEM 
gen . Inserting the profit functions
nd rearranging for β yields the proposed result. 
roof of Lemma 3 
The logic of the proof follows along exactly the same lines
s in Lemma 2 . The detailed exposition can be obtained from
he authors upon request. The functional form of c¯ 3 is c¯ 3 =
(αc c + δ(1 −δ)) γ
δ+ αc c γ+ δγ−β(1+ δγ )(1 −φ) −(1+ δγ ) φ−β(1 −δ−αc c γ ) ψ . 
roof of Lemma 4 
The proof is straightforward. Simple algebra and rearrange-
ents of terms in the condition c¯ 3 ≤ c¯ 1 yield the proposed result. 
roof of Proposition 3 
Under the condition δ ≥ ˜ cc n we know from Lemmas 2 and 3 that
ither partial or full remanufacturing will take place under IR
nd OEM remanufacturing, respectively. Let us first consider the
ase where α ≤ 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c . Lemma 4 informs us that whenever
≤ 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c the OEM will switch from partial to full remanufac-
uring in a cost environment where the IR would stick with par-
ial remanufacturing, i.e., c¯ 3 ≤ c¯ 1 . Thus, we compare three different
cenarios: 
(i) c ≤ c¯ 3 – both IR and OEM would perform partial remanufac-
turing. 
(ii) c¯ 3 < c ≤ c¯ 1 – the OEM remanufactures fully while the IR
would remanufactures partially. 
(iii) c¯ 1 < c – both IR and OEM would perform full remanufactur- 
ing. 
In scenario (i) we compare q r = δc n −˜ c4(c c + δ(1 −δ)) for IR partial re-
anufacturing from Table 3 , with q r = δc n −˜ c2(αc c + δ(1 −δ)) for OEM par-
ial remanufacturing from Table 9 . We observe that the numera-
ors are identical in both cases. Thus, we only need to compare the
enominators. OEM remanufacturing is larger than IR remanufac-
uring when the associated denominator of OEM q r is smaller than
he denominator of the IR q r , formally 2(αc c + δ(1 − δ)) ≤ 4(c c +
(1 − δ)) . Simple algebra yields α ≤ 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c , the proposed re-
ult. For scenarios (ii) and (iii), the result is found analogously. Let us now turn to the case α > 2 + δ(1 −δ) c c . In that case we
now from Lemma 4 that c¯ 3 > c¯ 1 . Thus we need to consider the
ollowing three scenarios: 
(i) c ≤ c¯ 1 – both IR and OEM would perform partial remanufac-
turing. 
(ii) c¯ 1 < c ≤ c¯ 3 – the IR remanufactures fully while the OEM re-
manufactures partially. 
(iii) c¯ 3 < c – both IR and OEM would perform full remanufactur-
ing. 
In an analogous fashion to above, comparing the remanufactur-
ng quantities of the two firms for each scenario yields the pro-
osed result. Specifically, we find that only in scenario (iii) does
EM remanufacturing exceed IR remanufacturing. 
ppendix B. Consumer surplus derivation 
In line with the assumptions made for deriving demand func-
ions (5) , we define the consumer surplus to be the cumulative
ifference between a consumer’s willingness to pay for the chosen
roduct (new or remanufactured) and the corresponding price. The
ssumptions are as follows (see, e.g., Debo et al., 2005; Oraiopou-
os et al., 2012; Souza, 2013 ): the willingness to pay for new
roducts θ is uniformly distributed among the consumers with
upport U [0, 1]. The willingness to pay for a remanufactured prod-
ct is a constant fraction δ of that one for a new product, i.e., δθ .
hus, for any customer the net utilities for buying a new, reman-
factured, or no product are U n = θ − p n , U r = δθ − p r , U z = 0 , re-
pectively, and consumer surplus (for a standardized market size of
) becomes ϒ = ∫ 1 0 max { U n , U r , U z } dθ . Switching points for θ be-
ween not buying and buying remanufactured and between buy-
ng remanufactured and new items, 0 ≤ θ zr < θ rn < 1 are given by
zr = p r δ , θrn = 
p n −p r 
1 −δ ( Abbey et al., 2017 ), and therefore consumer
urplus becomes: 
= 
∫ 1 
θrn 
(θ − p n ) dθ + 
∫ θrn 
θzr 
(δθ − p r ) dθ = 
[ 
1 
2 
θ2 − p n θ
] 1 
θrn 
+ 
[
δ
2 
θ2 − p r θ
]θrn 
θzr 
= q n 
(
1 − p n − q n 
2 
)
+ δq 
2 
r 
2 
ppendix C. Alternative competitive settings 
.1. Quantity competition 
In this model variant, we keep the sequence of events but re-
lace the price decisions by quantity decisions, i.e., after deciding
n the proprietary content β of the product, the OEM sets the
holesale price for proprietary spare parts w s and the quantity of
ew products q n to sell. Finally, the IR decides on the quantity of
emanufactured products q r . Solving the quantity competition, we
btain the following results, structured analogously to Lemma 2 . 
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Table C.11 
Equilibrium prices and quantities in all three strategy regions. 
Strategy R1 R2 R3 
region No remanufacturing Partial remanufacturing Full remanufacturing 
w s ≥ c p + δ(1 −c n ) 2 c p + δ−˜ c2 − (δc n −˜ c)(2 c c + δ(1 −δ)) 
2 
2[(2 c c +2 −δ−δ2 ) 2 −4(1 −δ2 )(1 −3 δ)] c p + 
δ(1 −c n ) 
2 
+ 2(1 −c n )(1 −δ)(c c + δ(1 −δ)) γ
2 c c (1+ γ )+(1 −δ)(2+ δ+3 δγ ) 
p n 
1+ c n 
2 
1+ c n 
2 
+ (δc n −˜ c)(1 −δ)(2 c c + δ(1 −δ)) 
(2 c c +2 −δ−δ2 ) 2 −4(1 −δ2 )(1 −3 δ) 
1+ c n 
2 
+ (1 −c n )(1 −δ)(2 c c + δ(1 −δ)) γ
2[2 c c (1+ γ )+(1 −δ)(2+ δ+3 δγ )] 
p r n.a. δ
1+ c n 
2 
− 2 δ(1 −δ) 2 (δc n −˜ c) 
(2 c c +2 −δ−δ2 ) 2 −4(1 −δ2 )(1 −3 δ) δ
1+ c n 
2 
− (1 −c n )(1 −δ) 2 δγ
2 c c (1+ γ )+(1 −δ)(2+ δ+3 δγ ) 
q n 
1 −c n 
2 
1 −c n 
2 
− (δc n −˜ c)(2 c c +3 δ(1 −δ)) 
(2 c c +2 −δ−δ2 ) 2 −4(1 −δ2 )(1 −3 δ) 
1 −c n 
2 
− (1 −c n )(2 c c +3 δ(1 −δ)) γ
2[2 c c (1+ γ )+(1 −δ)(2+ δ+3 δγ )] 
q r 0 
(δc n −˜ c)(2 c c +2 −δ−δ2 ) 
(2 c c +2 −δ−δ2 ) 2 −4(1 −δ2 )(1 −3 δ) γ q n 
c¯ N 1 = (4 c 
2 
c +(1 −δ) 2 δ(8+ δ)+4 c c (2 −δ(1+ δ))) γ
(4 c 2 c +(1 −δ) 2 δ(8+ δ)+4 c c (2 −δ(1+ δ))) γ+2(2 c c (1+ γ )+(1 −δ)(2+ δ+3 δγ ))(δ−β(1 −φ) −φ) −β(2 c c +(1 −δ)(2+ δ))(2 −2 c c γ−δ(2+ γ−δγ )) ψ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. C5. Strategy regions in the case of an OEM using proprietary parts, under dif- 
ferent types of competition: Stackelberg price competition (bold), Stackelberg quan- 
tity competition (dashed), Nash price competition (dotted). 
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 Lemma 5. Characteristics of the equilibrium regions for a fixed value
of β are given in Table C.10 . Given new production is profitable using
proprietary parts, there exists a threshold value for the marginal pro-
duction cost of a new product, c¯ Q 
1 
, and the equilibrium regions can be
described as follows: 
No remanufacturing. If δc n < ˜ c, the IR does not enter the market and
the OEM acts as a monopolist. 
Partial remanufacturing. If δc n ≥ ˜ c and c < c¯ Q 1 , the IR enters the mar-
ket but does not remanufacture all available cores. 
Full remanufacturing. If δc n ≥ ˜ c and c ≥ c¯ Q 1 , the IR enters the market
and remanfactures all available cores. 
The proof of Lemma 5 follows along the same lines as the proof
of Lemma 2 and is omitted here. It can be obtained from the au-
thors upon request. 
These results confirm the structural similarity of the price and
quantity competition models. The bound for R1 (no remanufactur-
ing) is identical to the bound in our original setting (see Lemma 2 ).
Comparing the thresholds c¯ Q 
1 
and c¯ 1 we find that c¯ 
Q 
1 
> c¯ 1 . Thus,
under quantity competition, the region where partial remanufac-
turing is optimal is larger. 
C2. Simultaneous market price decisions 
In this model variant, we abstract from the Stackelberg setting
and consider a situation where the OEM and the IR set their mar-
ket prices p n and p r simultaneously. The associated sequence of
events is as follows: Initially, the OEM decides on the proprietary
content β of the product. Then the OEM sets the wholesale price
for proprietary spare parts w s . Finally, the OEM and the IR simulta-
neously decide on p n and p r , respectively. Solving the third stage as
a Nash-game, we obtain the following results, which are structured
analogously to Lemma 2 . 
Lemma 6. Characteristics of the equilibrium regions for a fixed value
of β are given in Table C.11 . Given new production is profitable using
proprietary parts, there exists a threshold value for the marginal pro-
duction cost of a new product, c¯ N 
1 
, and the equilibrium regions can be
described as follows: 
No remanufacturing. If δc n < ˜ c, the IR does not enter the market and
the OEM acts as a monopolist. 
Partial remanufacturing. If δc n ≥ ˜ c and c < c¯ N 1 , the IR enters the mar-
ket but does not remanufacture all available cores. 
Full remanufacturing. If δc n ≥ ˜ c and c ≥ c¯ N 1 , the IR enters the market
and remanfactures all available cores. 
The proof of Lemma 6 follows along the same lines as the proof
of Lemma 2 and is omitted here. It can be obtained from the au-
thors upon request. These results confirm the structural similarity
of the price and quantity competition models. The bound for R1
(no remanufacturing) is identical to the bound in our original set-
ting (see Lemma 2 ). Comparing the thresholds c¯ N and c¯ 1 we find1 hat c¯ N 
1 
< c¯ 1 . Thus, under simultaneous market pricing decisions,
he region where partial remanufacturing is optimal is smaller. 
To conclude, Fig. C5 visualizes the variations in the strategy
pace implied by the different types of competition, clearly high-
ighting the structural similarity of the results. 
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